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ARBITRATION
John Allen Chalk, Sr.*
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period (December 1, 2018, through November 30,
2019), the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and Texas state courts issued opinions affecting arbitration law.
This article surveys these developments, including cases governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA).
The article first discusses recent arbitration developments in the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Next, the article addresses court procedure for compelling
arbitration and focuses on the legal standard and process that courts ap-
ply to rule on different motions intended to enforce arbitration agree-
ments. The next section of the article addresses post-arbitration court
challenges and confirmations, focusing on jurisdictional issues, standing
issues, timing issues, and grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitra-
tor’s decision.
* Member at Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz PLLC, B.S. Tennessee Tech Uni-
versity, M.A. Tennessee Tech University, J.D. University of Texas School of Law. My
thanks to Brandie Moser, a third-year law student at Texas A&M University School of
Law, for her research and drafting assistance.
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II. ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
During the Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed arbitra-
tion issues in three cases. First, the Court in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer
& White Sales, Inc. followed First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan re-
garding delegation of gateway issues.1 In First Options, the Court held
that parties may delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator so
long as the arbitration agreement does so by “‘clear and unmistakable’
evidence.”2 Since that 1995 decision, however, some appellate courts had
refused to enforce clear and unmistakable delegation clauses if the argu-
ment for arbitration was “wholly groundless.”3 The Court in Henry
Schein rejected the wholly groundless exception and held that courts may
not override a clear and unmistakable delegation of gateway issues to an
arbitrator.4 In rejecting the wholly groundless exception, the Court rea-
soned that the exception was inconsistent with the FAA, which does not
contain such an exception, and the Court’s precedent.5
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira ad-
dressed the scope of FAA coverage.6 While the FAA usually governs ar-
bitration provisions within employment-related contracts,7 the FAA does
not apply to “contracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.”8 The respondent in New Prime, a truck driver
hired as an independent contractor of the petitioner trucking company,
argued that he was exempted from the FAA as a transportation worker.9
The Court agreed and held that the exception applies to transportation
workers regardless of whether they are employees or independent con-
tractors.10 Additionally, the Court clarified that courts, not arbitrators,
must determine whether an agreement is excluded from FAA coverage
even when there is a gateway delegation clause.11
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela ad-
dressed an obstacle to classwide arbitration—ambiguity in the arbitration
agreement.12 The Court held that courts may not compel classwide arbi-
tration if the arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to whether the par-
1. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 (2019); First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
2. First Options of Chi., 514 U.S. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers
of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
3. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529 (“Those courts have reasoned that the ‘wholly
groundless’ exception enables courts to block frivolous attempts to transfer disputes from
the court system to arbitration.”).
4. Id. at 531.
5. Id. at 528, 531.
6. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536 (2019).
7. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).
8. Id. § 1 (commonly known as the transportation worker exception).
9. New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 536.
10. Id. at 543–44.
11. Id. at 537.
12. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)) (“We therefore face the question
whether, consistent with the FAA, an ambiguous agreement can provide the necessary
‘contractual basis’ for compelling class arbitration.”).
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ties agreed to arbitrate on a class basis.13 In making this decision, the
Court emphasized key differences between classwide and bilateral arbi-
tration to show why the Court requires an unambiguous contractual basis
to find that parties agreed to sacrifice the principal advantages of bilateral
arbitration.14
III. COMPELLING ARBITRATION
This section surveys cases where a party sought court assistance to
bring another party to arbitration by filing a motion to compel.
A. DELEGATION OF GATEWAY ARBITRABILITY QUESTIONS
When considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first
determine who decides questions of arbitrability: the court or the arbitra-
tor. Long-standing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence notes that ques-
tions of arbitrability, as potentially dispositive “gateway” questions, are
presumptively for the courts to decide.15 As the Supreme Court stated,
gateway arbitrability questions are “rather arcane,”16 and cannot be pre-
sumed to have crossed the parties’ minds when negotiating the terms of
the binding agreement to arbitrate without clear and unmistakable intent
to send such questions to arbitration.17 Therefore, courts should presume
that the question of arbitrability remains with the court.18 This presump-
tion can be overcome with clear and unmistakable evidence of the par-
ties’ intent to have the arbitrator determine arbitrability questions even
when the trial court would ordinarily be the proper forum to hear such
validity issues.19
If the party seeking to compel arbitration argues there is a clause dele-
gating arbitrability questions to an arbitrator, the court must determine
“whether the purported delegation clause is in fact a delegation clause.”20
If the agreement to arbitrate includes a proper delegation clause and the
opponent does not directly challenge the delegation clause itself, the
court will compel arbitration; any questions about the validity of the en-
13. Id. at 1419.
14. Id. at 1416.
15. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S 63, 68–69, 69 n.1 (2010).
16. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
17. See, e.g., id.; AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
(“[T]he question of arbitrability . . . is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Un-
less the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).
18. This is different than the more common presumption in favor of arbitration when
the scope of an arbitration clause is at issue. When a contract is ambiguous or silent on the
parties’ intent to arbitrate an issue, the default presumptions are used to resolve ambigui-
ties and inconsistencies in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
19. Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P., 564 S.W.3d 105, 119 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
20. Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 743–44 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Kubala v.
Supreme Prod. Servs., Inc., 830 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 2016)).
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tire contract will be addressed by the arbitrator.21
Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. gave the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit a second opportunity on remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court22 to analyze the acknowledged delegation clause in
the parties’ arbitration agreement.23 The appellate court disposed of the
appeal with the same result as its first decision24—the district court’s de-
nial of a motion to compel arbitration was upheld—but for a different
reason.25 The arbitration agreement, agreed by the parties as valid, con-
tained an exception or “carve-out” construed by the court to modify the
“any dispute” scope language in the agreement.26 The parties’ exception
also came before the adoption of “the arbitration rules of the American
Arbitration Association.”27 Plaintiff’s claims included a request for in-
junctive relief and thereby the lawsuit qualified as “actions seeking in-
junctive relief” described in the exception or “carve-out.”28 Therefore,
there was no “clear and unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability to the
arbitrator regarding the excepted actions.29 The drafter of arbitration
clauses governed by the FAA that adopt arbitral arbitration rules should
review this second Fifth Circuit Archer & White opinion before including
a “carve-out” in the arbitration agreement.
Another key delegation case decided in the Survey period is 20/20
Communications, Inc. v. Crawford, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit joined the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh federal circuit courts of appeals30 in deciding that “class arbitra-
tion” is a “gateway” or “arbitrability” question reserved by default to the
court, not the arbitrator, “absent clear and unmistakable language in the
arbitration clause to the contrary.”31 The Fifth Circuit in this case decided
the court, not the arbitrator, is authorized to decide the “gateway issue”
of class arbitration.32
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Crawford combined two separate cases
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort
Worth Division, involving managers and other employees of 20/20 Com-
munications, Inc. who wanted to pursue class arbitration.33 Both cases
21. Id. at 744.
22. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 (2019).
23. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2019).
24. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 498 (5th Cir. 2017),
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019).
25. Archer & White, 935 F.3d at 277–78.
26. Id. at 281–82.
27. Id. at 278.
28. Id. at 283.
29. Id. at 281–82.
30. 20/20 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Crawford, 930 F.3d 715, 718–19 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations
to all federal circuit courts of appeals); see also Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761
F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2014).
31. Crawford, 930 F.3d at 718–19.
32. Id. at 717.
33. Id. at 717–18 (Blevins decision by Judge Means held that the parties’ class arbitra-
tion bar foreclosed class arbitration; Crawford decision by Judge McBryde confirmed a
clause construction award invalidating the class arbitration bar).
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were initiated by the employer in the district court in an attempt to pre-
serve the arbitration clause bar on class and collective claims in
arbitration.34
At least seven times throughout the Fifth Circuit’s Crawford opinion,
the court refers to and uses the “clear and unmistakable” phrase35 to de-
scribe the circumstance under which the arbitrator, not the court, would
be empowered to decide whether the parties’ arbitration agreement
“clearly and unmistakably” delegated such power to the arbitrator and
not the court.36 The Fifth Circuit in this case made it abundantly clear
that this delegation standard was not satisfied by various powers granted
the arbitrator by the parties’ arbitration agreement.37 These arbitrator
powers included: (1) the grant of power to the arbitrator to hear all “arbi-
trability” issues regarding “the formation or meaning of this Agreement”;
(2) exclusive power to determine “all disputes and claims between” the
parties; and (3) the power to administer the arbitration according to the
applicable AAA employment arbitration rules.38 None of these arbitrator
powers, “standing alone,” could overcome “clearly and unmistakably”
the parties’ agreed class arbitration bar.39
Crawford turned on the Fifth Circuit’s construction of the parties’ arbi-
tration agreement and only incidentally did the court choose the opportu-
nity to state that class arbitration is a “gateway” or “arbitrability”
question for the court, not the arbitrator, unless there is a clear and un-
mistakable delegation of the class arbitration question to the arbitrator in
the arbitration agreement.40 The Fifth Circuit also made it clear that for
“the gateway issue of class arbitration presented here,” courts, not arbitra-
tors, must decide “the gateway issue.”41 The practitioner should take
away that there are “gateway issues” that are not arbitrability questions,
and as Crawford demonstrates, there are “gateway issues of arbitrability”
reserved for the court, one of which is class arbitration.
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed delegation issues in RSL
Funding, LLC v. Newsome.42 The trial court entered an order approving
34. The arbitration clause authorized the arbitrator to “hear only individual claims”
and prohibited arbitration “as a class or collective action . . . to the maximum extent per-
mitted by law.” Id. at 719–20.
35. Id. at 717–18, 720–21; see also AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (courts should not assume that parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is “clear[ ] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so).
36. Crawford, 930 F.3d at 718 (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019)).
37. Id. at 721 (“Because when we compare these provisions with the class arbitration
bar at issue in this case, we conclude that none of them state with the requisite clear and
unmistakable language that arbitrators, rather than courts, shall decide questions of class
arbitrability.”).
38. Id. at 720.
39. Id. at 721.
40. Id. at 718 (“a gateway issue”), 719 (“a threshold question of arbitrability” and “a
foundational question of arbitrability”), 721 (“a gateway issue”).
41. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
42. 569 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Tex. 2018).
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an agreement to transfer certain structured settlement payment rights.43
Pursuant to the arbitration provision in the transfer agreement, RSL filed
a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied.44 The Fifth
Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to compel.45
The supreme court, however, held that the “arbitrator, rather than [the]
court, was required to decide arbitrability of dispute[s] involving the
transfer of structured settlement payment rights, even though [the] legis-
lature assigned approval of structured settlement transfers to the courts
under [the] Structured Settlement Protection Act.”46 The supreme court
further held that “whether [the] transfer agreement was void on public
policy grounds was required to be decided by [the] arbitrator.”47
B. EXISTENCE OF AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
In reviewing a motion to compel arbitration, courts in the Fifth Circuit
first “determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute at
issue.”48 In making this determination, courts consider “(1) whether there
is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the
dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.”49
While it is well-settled that any doubts regarding scope should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration, the legal standard applicable to the exis-
tence of an agreement to arbitrate is not as clear.50
In Jackson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas adopted the magistrate judge’s opinion
denying Royal Caribbean’s motion to compel arbitration.51 The magis-
trate judge’s opinion contains a long recitation of the facts related to this
maritime contract dispute (involving multiple e-mails and related docu-
ments, as well as Jackson’s claim of an oral contract).52 The magistrate
judge’s opinion in Jackson surveys both Fifth Circuit and other federal
circuit court cases and concludes that the “summary judgment standard”
in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 is the appropriate standard
to apply in deciding a motion to compel arbitration.53 Matos v. AT&T
Corp.54 and Hatch v. Jones55 follow and apply the same Rule 56 standard
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 120.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 116 (Westlaw summary).
47. Id. (Westlaw summary).
48. Jackson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 389 F. Supp. 3d 431, 443 (N.D. Tex.
2019) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had not clearly laid out what standard district courts
should apply when ruling on motions to compel).
49. Id. (quoting Safer v. Nelson Fin. Grp., Inc., 422 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2005)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 437.
52. Id. at 438–42.
53. Id. at 443–44.
54. No. 3:18-CU-02591-M-BK, 2019 WL 5191922, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2019),
adopted by 2019 WL 5191487 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2019) (applying the Federal Arbitration
Act).
55. No. 4:18-CV-04146, 2019 WL 6137389, at *5 n.11 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019), adopted
by 2019 WL 6135119 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2019) (applying the Federal Arbitration Act) (a
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for motions to compel that was adopted in Jackson v. Royal Caribbean.
In a subsequent case, Trammel v. AccentCare, Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly applied a summary judgment-like
standard in reversing the lower court’s decision to grant a motion to com-
pel arbitration.56 In Trammel, the Fifth Circuit decided that the plaintiff
was entitled to a jury trial because she “created a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding whether an arbitration agreement was formed.”57
The dispute in Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C. involved a
policy purchased from Lloyd’s Syndicate to insure an oil platform co-
owned and operated by Chevron.58 Chevron also entered into a contract
with FloaTEC for engineering work on the platform; this contract con-
tained an arbitration provision. In court, Lloyd’s Syndicate attempted to
compel arbitration with FloaTEC based on FloaTEC’s agreement to arbi-
trate with the insured. The insurer argued that since the engineering con-
tract contained a broad delegation clause that required arbitration of all
“gateway arbitrability issues,” the question of whether the policy’s subro-
gation waiver barred the insurer’s claims should have been delegated to
the arbitrator.59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however,
affirmed the trial court’s decision that because the insurer was not a party
to the engineering contract, the insurer could not benefit from that con-
tract’s arbitration provision.60 The Fifth Circuit explained that a district
court’s initial role is to “determine whether the parties entered into any
arbitration agreement at all.”61 Here, as the Fifth Circuit confirmed, the
parties did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate.62
In Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals, by a di-
vided panel with Justice Bridges dissenting, affirmed a Dallas County
District Court’s order denying the appellants’ motion to compel arbitra-
tion.63 In its lengthy opinion discussing evidentiary hearing testimony, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel
after the evidentiary hearing in which the parties agreed to the admission
of affidavits (to be considered the same as live testimony) by three for-
mer employees of an employee staffing company claiming none of them
knew of or signed electronically or in any other form respective arbitra-
tion agreements. The employer presented live testimony at the eviden-
tiary hearing and did not object to the introduction of the employee
question of fact regarding whether the parties orally agreed to arbitration was raised by the
plaintiff’s competing affidavit; the magistrate judge observed that “[u]nder the summary
judgment-like standard applied by some courts in the Fifth Circuit, this would defeat the
motion to compel arbitration.”).
56. Trammel v. AccentCare, Inc., 776 F. App’x 208, 211 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 211 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
58. Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C., 921 F.3d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2019).
59. Id. at 513–14.
60. Id. at 514–15.
61. Id. at 514 (quoting IQ Prods. Co. v. WD-40 Co., 871 F.3d 344. 348 (5th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis in original)).
62. Id. at 515–16.
63. Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd, No. 05-18-00579-CV, 2019 WL 4025040, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 27, 2019, pet. filed).
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affidavits as “live testimony.”64 The court of appeals applied “a no-evi-
dence standard to the trial court’s factual determinations and a de novo
standard to legal determinations” and described the evidentiary hearing
as a “Tipps hearing.”65 Aerotek concludes that the trial court’s decision
on a motion to compel after an evidentiary hearing is reviewed by the
appellate court for “legal sufficiency” and then explains four separate
ways that “evidence [can be] legally insufficient” on review.66
Another issue as to whether an agreement to arbitrate exists are condi-
tions precedent within a dispute resolution clause. For example, the ex-
press language of the arbitration clause at issue in Carter v. ZB, National
Association conditioned the parties’ agreement to arbitrate on the occur-
rence of one of the following: (1) the applicable law not permitting a jury-
trial waiver; or (2) a court ruling that a jury-trial waiver is not permit-
ted.67 In this case, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that
no agreement to arbitrate existed since neither of those conditions prece-
dent were met.68
C. SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT
The scope of an agreement to arbitrate determines what claims are ar-
bitrable.69 Doubts regarding an arbitration agreement’s scope “should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the con-
struction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.”70 After determining that a valid arbitra-
tion agreement exists, the analysis turns to whether the alleged dispute
falls within the scope of the agreement.71 Most arbitration agreements
are written very broadly to cover “all disputes” or “all claims” relating to
either the contract itself or possibly even to the relationship formed by
the contract. These broad agreements often withstand judicial review
both for validity and scope. Many cases during the Survey period include
arguments about the scope of the arbitration agreement.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id. at *5 (quoting Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P. v. J.A. Green Dev. Corp.,
327 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)). Texas civil procedure, based on the
Texas General Arbitration Act (TGAA), calls for a summary determination of motions to
compel but if the “material facts necessary to determine” the existence of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement are controverted, “the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine the disputed material facts.” Id. at *15. Tipps is a case of first impression in
which the Texas Supreme Court distinguished a “summary” versus an “evidentiary” hear-
ing on a motion to compel arbitration under both the FAA and the TGAA. Jack B. Anglin
Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992).
66. Aerotek, 2019 WL 4025040, at *5.
67. Carter v. ZB, Nat’l Ass’n, 578 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, no pet.).
68. Id. at 624.
69. Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P., 564 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); see also Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 743 (5th
Cir. 2018).
70. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002)).
71. John Allen Chalk, Sr., Arbitration, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 25, 33 (2019).
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For example, in Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., a labor union claimed an employer vio-
lated their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by “lay[ing] off over
seven hundred Union employees and contract[ing] out many . . . jobs.”72
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas found that the
dispute “was covered by the CBA’s arbitration provision and the Union
failed to exhaust the remedies provided by the CBA.”73 Thus, “[t]he dis-
trict court dismissed the Union’s complaint for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction.”74 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this
decision and held that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdic-
tion because the labor union’s dispute with the employer was within the
scope of the CBA’s arbitration provisions.75
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a different
conclusion, however, in Papalote Creek II, L.L.C. v. Lower Colorado
River Authority.76 In this case, a wind farm operator sued the Lower Col-
orado River Authority (LCRA) for allegedly breaching their power
purchase agreement when it stopped purchasing power from Papalote.
The issue in the case concerned whether there was a liability cap for
LCRA if it stopped purchasing power. LCRA sought to compel arbitra-
tion of this issue. The parties’ purchase agreement contained an arbitra-
tion clause that required the parties to arbitrate “any dispute [that] arises
with respect to either [p]arty’s performance.”77 The Fifth Circuit found
that the “arbitration clause clearly signified the parties’ intent to limit
arbitration to performance-related disputes only,” so that “interpreta-
tion-related dispute[s] did not fall within the scope of the agreement’s
arbitration clause.”78 Accordingly, since the liability cap issue was rooted
in contract interpretation, the Fifth Circuit held that the dispute fell
outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and needed to be resolved
in court.79
All doubts regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, especially when the arbitration clause is
very broad.80 This rule is emphasized in Gray v. Ward, where a withdraw-
ing partner sued the general partner, claiming breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, wrongful discharge, and defamation.81 The arbitration
agreement applied to “‘all disputes and claims relating to’ (i) ‘this Agree-
72. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 781 F. App’x 339, 340
(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 343–44.
76. 918 F.3d 450, 451–52 (5th Cir. 2019).
77. Id. at 451–52 (alteration in original).
78. Id. at 450 (Westlaw summary).
79. Id. at 457.
80. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. pro-
ceeding); BDO Seidman, LLP v. J.A. Green Dev. Corp., 327 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, no pet.).
81. Gray v. Ward, No. 05-18-00266-CV, 2019 WL 3759466, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Aug. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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ment,’ (ii) ‘the rights and obligations of the parties hereto,’ and (iii) ‘any
claims or causes of action relating to the performance of either party.’”82
After the general partner filed a motion to compel arbitration, the district
court compelled arbitration for the breach of contract and breach of fidu-
ciary duty claims only.83 The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals found that the
withdrawing partner’s defamation and wrongful termination claims were
also within the scope of the limited partnership agreement’s arbitration
clause.84 Since the agreement contained broad language such as “all dis-
putes” and “relating to,” the court resolved the dispute in favor of
arbitration.85
This presumption in favor of arbitration can be seen in Houston NFL
Holding L.P. v. Ryans, as well.86 In that case, DeMarco Ryans, a former
player in the National Football League (NFL) sued his former NFL team
for premises liability, alleging that the team had failed to provide him
with a reasonably safe field. The issue was whether the tort claim fell
within the scope of an arbitration clause in the CBA. Since the applicable
arbitration provision was titled “Non-Injury Grievance,” Ryans argued
that his injury-related claim was not within the scope of the agreement.
The First Houston Court of Appeals, however, rejected this argument
and found that the “heading . . . entitled ‘Non-Injury Grievance’ did not
indicate that [the] player’s negligent injury claim fell outside [the arbitra-
tion agreement’s] scope.”87 This decision again relied on the broad lan-
guage of the provision, which covered:
Any dispute . . . involving the interpretation of, application of, or
compliance with, any provision of [the CBA], the NFL Player Con-
tract, the Practice Squad Player Contract, or any applicable provision
of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws or NFL Rules pertaining to the
terms and conditions of employment of NFL players, will be resolved
exclusively in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Article,
except wherever another method of dispute resolution is set forth
elsewhere in this Agreement.88
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the CBA required arbitra-
tion of the player’s claims.89
Rodriguez v. Texas Leaguer Brewing Co., on the other hand, illustrates
how a party can overcome the policy of interpreting scope ambiguities in
favor of arbitration.90 In that case, members in a brewing limited liability
company sued the company, alleging securities fraud and breach of an
82. Id. at *4.
83. Id. at *14.
84. Id. at *6.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Hous. NFL Holding L.P. v. Ryans, 581 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2019, pet. filed) (Westlaw summary).
87. Id. at 900.
88. Id. at 908 (alteration in original).
89. Id. at 911.
90. Rodriguez v. Tex. Leaguer Brewing Co., 586 S.W.3d 423, 433 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
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agreement to repay a loan made to the company. Since the company
agreements required arbitration of any and all claims arising out of or
relating to the agreement, the district court granted the company’s mo-
tion to compel arbitration of all the members’ claims.91 The Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals, however, held that while the “securities fraud
claim was within [the] scope of [the] arbitration clause,” the “members’
claim that [the] company breached [the] loan agreement was not subject
to [the] arbitration clause.”92 Since the alleged loan agreement was not
mentioned in the membership agreement, the court found that the breach
of contract claim did not relate to or arise out of the company agree-
ments.93 This case shows that some disputes can fall outside the scope of
an arbitration clause, even if the clause is very broad and even though
public policy favors arbitration.
D. BANKRUPTCY COURT’S RIGHT TO REFUSE
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit previously ruled in In
re National Gypsum Co. that bankruptcy courts may decline to enforce
arbitration clauses if the following requirements are met: (1) the proceed-
ing must adjudicate statutory rights conferred by the Bankruptcy Code
and not the debtor’s pre-petition legal or equitable rights; and (2) requir-
ing arbitration must conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.94
Thus, the Fifth Circuit has “held that bankruptcy courts need not enforce
agreements to arbitrate whether a creditor’s efforts to collect a debt vio-
lated a discharge order.”95
During the Survey period, this ruling was questioned in light of the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.96 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in In re Henry, found that the test
it established in National Gypsum was still good law notwithstanding
Epic Systems.97 The court emphasized that “National Gypsum looked to
‘the purpose of the [Bankruptcy] Code, including the goal of centralized
resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, the need to protect creditors and
reorganizing debtors from piecemeal litigation, and the undisputed power
of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders.’”98 Ultimately, the court
decided that the “type of statutory-purpose analysis” employed in Na-
91. Id. at 426–27.
92. Id. at 423 (Westlaw summary).
93. Id. at 433.
94. Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. NGC Settlement Tr. & Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Co. (In re
Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056, 1069 (5th Cir. 1997); Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy),
299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1067).
95. Henry v. Educ. Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (quoting Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1071) (“A debtor’s right to be free from collec-
tion efforts for discharged debts is a creature of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
An action to enforce such a right implicates an important bankruptcy policy, the ability of a
bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders, such that requiring arbitration ‘would be in-
consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.’”).
96. Id.; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).
97. In re Henry, 944 F.3d at 592.
98. Id. (quoting Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1069).
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tional Gypsum “remains a valid tool for determining whether a given stat-
ute displaces the FAA,” and is not affected by the Supreme Court ruling
in Epic Systems.99
IV. CHALLENGING OR CONFIRMING AN ARBITRATOR’S
DECISION
A. JURISDICTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Adam Joseph Re-
sources (M) Sdn. Brotherhood v. CNA Metals Ltd.,100 following an earlier
Fifth Circuit decision,101 held that 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 created federal
court jurisdiction for a Houston, Texas law firm’s motion to intervene and
its Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from
a final judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.102 Both law firm motions denied by the district court were the law
firm’s attempt to remedy an undisclosed agreement reached between the
law firm’s client and the losing arbitration party that cheated (the word
used by the district court in its initial opinion) the movant law firm out of
its earned contingency fee resulting from an international commercial ar-
bitration award for the law firm’s client. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion pro-
vides helpful guidance regarding how U.S. federal court jurisdiction arises
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.
In Conn Appliances, Inc. v. Williams, a creditor sought to “vacate [an]
arbitration award in favor of [a] consumer on [Telephone Consumer Pro-
tection Act] claims . . . relating to calls from [the] creditor after [the]
consumer missed payments under [a] retail installment contract.”103 The
consumer “moved to dismiss the Texas case for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion” because he “did not have sufficient contacts within the state to give
rise to jurisdiction.”104 Though the consumer entered into a contract with
a Texas entity, the consumer entered into that contract at a Tennessee
store, the contract was governed by Tennessee law, and the arbitration
was held in Tennessee.105 Accordingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that “[the] creditor failed to establish [a] prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction over [the] consumer.”106
99. Id.
100. 919 F.3d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 2019).
101. See generally Stemcor USA, Inc. v. CIA Siderurgica Do Para Cosipar, 895 F.3d 375
(5th Cir. 2018) (opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 927 F.3d 906 (5th Cir. 2019)).
102. Adam Joseph, 919 F.3d at 869. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s deni-
als of the law firm’s motions and remanded the case to the district court for consideration
of the law firm’s claims for recovery of its earned contingency fee. Id.
103. Conn Appliances, Inc. v. Williams, 936 F.3d 345, 345 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(Westlaw summary).
104. Id. at 347.
105. Id. at 348.
106. Id. at 345 (Westlaw summary).
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B. STANDING TO CHALLENGE
Another interesting problem posed during the Survey period was who
has standing to challenge an arbitrator’s award. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Horner v. American Air-
lines, Inc.107 In this case, “pilots who had worked for [an acquired] airline
[sued the] acquiring airline’s union under the Railway Labor Act . . .
seeking to vacate and enjoin implementation of [an] arbitration award in
favor of [the] acquiring airline.”108 The arbitrator found that the “pilots’
job protections under [their] collective bargaining agreement had ex-
pired” and issued an arbitration award in favor of the airline.109 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the “pilots
lacked standing to challenge [the] arbitration award.”110 Practitioners
should be aware that “an individual grievant generally lacks standing to
challenge the results of a binding arbitration process where a union has
the sole authority to compel arbitration under a CBA formed pursuant to
the RLA.”111
C. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
A party’s right to challenge an arbitration award, although limited, can
be waived.112 The party challenging an award must be vigilant and timely
with pre-award objections that preserve the alleged error for review.113
This waiver issue arose in two cases during the Survey period—Light-
Age v. Ashcroft-Smith114 and In re Marriage of Piske.115 Light-Age in-
volved a fee dispute between an attorney and his client, who refused to
pay the allegedly excessive legal fees.116 The parties agreed to resolve the
fee dispute in arbitration.117 According to the applicable arbitration rules,
one panelist had to be a non-lawyer with no financial interest in the prac-
tice of law. After the arbitration hearing, the client learned that the se-
lected non-lawyer panelist was a full-time payroll manager at a large law
firm. The client sought to vacate the arbitration award in favor of the
attorney on the grounds that the arbitration panel was improperly
formed.118 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however,
found that the client had constructive knowledge that the non-lawyer
panelist worked at a law firm before the hearing, because the client could
107. 927 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
108. Id. at 340 (Westlaw summary).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 342.
112. See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 998 (5th Cir.
1995), abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 591–92
(2008).
113. Brook v. Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002).
114. 922 F.3d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
115. 578 S.W.3d 624, 631–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
116. Light-Age, 922 F.3d at 321.
117. Id. (under the Houston Bar Association’s fee-dispute program).
118. Id. at 321.
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have found that information “simply by clicking on the link provided in
[the panelist’s] email signature or running a brief internet search.”119 So,
it is important that parties conduct adequate due diligence regarding arbi-
trators prior to an arbitration hearing.
In re Marriage of Piske, on the other hand, illustrates how a party to an
arbitration may not waive their right to challenge an arbitrator’s award if
the full extent of the objectionable issue is unknown at the time of the
hearing.120 In this case, a divorcing husband and wife agreed to appoint
Warren Cole to arbitrate their disputes.121 “At the parties’ initial . . . con-
ference with Cole, [Cole] represented that he did not have a material
relationship” with either party or their respective legal counsel.122 Several
weeks passed after the final hearing and Cole had not yet issued his rul-
ing, so the husband’s co-counsel sent Cole an email requesting that he
issue his ruling. In the email, the husband’s attorney stated that she
thought of Cole as a friend. Cole subsequently issued a ruling in the hus-
band’s favor. The wife sought to vacate the award on the grounds of evi-
dent partiality. The husband argued that the ex-wife had waived her
evident partiality claim by proceeding with the arbitration after the email
in question.123 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals disagreed,
finding that the email “did not disclose the later-discovered extent of [the
attorney and Cole’s] personal and business connections.”124
D. GROUNDS FOR VACATUR
“There are no common-law grounds for vacating an arbitration award”
under either the FAA or the TAA.125 Instead, both statutes enumerate
specific grounds to vacate an arbitration award.126
Under the FAA, an . . . award may be vacated . . . (1) “where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”[;] (2)
“where there was evidence of partiality or corruption” in any of the
arbitrators; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or
other misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of a party; or (4) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers or “so imperfectly executed
119. Id. at 323.
120. In re Marriage of Piske, 578 S.W.3d at 631–32.
121. Id. at 626.
122. Id. at 627.
123. Id. at 631.
124. Id. (quoting Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518,
528 (Tex. 2014)) (“[The appellant] did not waive its evident partiality challenge by proceed-
ing to arbitration based upon information it was unaware of at that time. To hold otherwise
would put a premium on concealment in a context where the Supreme Court has long
required full disclosure.”).
125. Holmes Builders at Castle Hills, Ltd. v. Gordon, No. 05-16-00887-CV, 2018 WL
1081635, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The common-law
claim of manifest disregard for the law is no longer a basis by which a court can vacate an
arbitration award. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.088;
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. 2016); C Tekk Sols., Inc. v. Sricom, Inc., No.
05-17-00845-CV, 2018 WL 2072811, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
126. Holmes Builders, 2018 WL 1081635, at *2.
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them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.”127
The party seeking to vacate the award bears the burden of proof and
must timely serve a notice of the motion to vacate the award.128
1. Evident Partiality
Under the TAA, a trial court shall vacate an arbitrator’s award if evi-
dent partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator
prejudices the rights of a party.129 The party seeking vacatur must show
that the arbitrator failed to disclose facts “which might, to an objective
observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.”130
However, an arbitrator is not obligated to disclose trivial relationships or
connections.131 Showing nondisclosure of non-trivial, material relation-
ships and connections is enough to establish evident partiality, regardless
of whether the nondisclosed information actually shows partiality or
bias.132
In re Marriage of Piske is a good example of a successful vacatur based
on evident partiality. In that case, a divorcing husband and wife agreed to
resolve their disputes in arbitration.133 After the final arbitration hearing,
the husband’s co-counsel sent an email to the arbitrator asking if the arbi-
trator could issue his ruling soon since the deadline for the award had
passed, reminding the arbitrator that the arbitrator and co-counsel were
good friends. A few weeks later, the arbitrator issued his ruling in favor
of the husband.134 The wife later discovered that: (1) the husband’s attor-
ney had been a guest at the arbitrator’s home three or four times for
cookouts; (2) the attorney and the arbitrator spent a weekend “at a mu-
tual friend’s ranch” together with “their respective significant others”; (3)
the arbitrator has previously served in that capacity on another case of
the attorney; and (4) the arbitrator “had mediated disputes for [the hus-
127. Thiessen v. Fid. Bank, No. 02-17-00321-CV, 2018 WL 599331, at *14 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10).
128. See Craig v. Sw. Secs., Inc., No. 05-16-01378-CV, 2017 WL 6503213, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant did not meet the three-month
statute of limitations to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award in § 12 of the FAA);
see also Reitman v. Yandell, No. 02-17-00245-CV, 2018 WL 1324775, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (same); Parker v. United-Bilt
Homes, LLC, No. 12-17-00054-CV, 2017 WL 6350021, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 13,
2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (the trial court was required to confirm the arbitration award
“because [the homeowner] did not attempt to demonstrate grounds for vacating the arbi-
tration award under either the FAA or the TAA”).
129. Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tex. 2017).
130. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Tex.
2014).
131. Id.
132. Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997); Builders First
Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, 515 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
pet. denied).
133. In re Marriage of Piske, 578 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, no pet.).
134. Id. at 627.
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band’s attorney] on five-or-six occasions.”135 Since the arbitrator failed to
disclose these connections to the wife or her attorney, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals vacated the arbitrator’s award for evident
partiality.136
In Xerox Commercial Solutions, LLC v. Segura, however, the Eighth
El Paso Court of Appeals reached a different outcome.137 Segura sued
Xerox, claiming employment discrimination on the basis of age. The arbi-
trator ruled in favor of Xerox, because he found that “the arbitration was
not timely initiated.”138 Segura sought to vacate the award on the basis of
evident partiality, arguing that the arbitrator “[failed] to disclose prior
dealings with Xerox.”139 The only evidence that Segura presented to
show prior dealings was that two Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Ser-
vices (JAMS) arbitrators made a presentation of arbitration best practices
to a group of Xerox attorneys. However, that presentation occurred after
the arbitrator’s ruling and there was no evidence that the arbitrator was
one of the presenters. Since Segura’s claim rested solely on the activity of
the arbitrator’s employer (JAMS) and not on the actual bias of the arbi-
trator himself, the court of appeals found that there was no evident
partiality.140
2. Exceeded Powers
The arbitrator’s authority is created by the parties’ arbitration agree-
ment.141 Some arbitration agreements give wide latitude to the arbitrator.
Other arbitration agreements limit the arbitrator’s authority to specific
decisions.142 “Arbitrators exceed their powers when they decide matters
not properly before them or where the resulting award is not rationally
inferable from the parties’ agreement.”143 The TAA restricts court re-
view, stating: “[t]he fact that the relief granted by the arbitrators could
not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground
for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.”144 Therefore, because the
courts give wide deference to arbitrators and the court only has limited
135. Id. at 627–28.
136. Id. at 629–30.
137. Xerox Commercial Sols., LLC v. Segura, 579 S.W.3d 170, 179 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2019, no pet.).
138. Id. at 171–72.
139. Id. at 175.
140. Id. at 179–80.
141. Constr. Fin. Servs. v. Douzart, No. 09-16-00035-CV, 2018 WL 1096103, at *4, *5
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Arbitrator fashioned an
equitable remedy, an option not limited by the arbitration agreement. Thus, the arbitrator
did not exceed his or her authority.).
142. See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex. 2011).
143. Holmes Builders at Castle Hills, Ltd. v. Gordon, No. 05-16-00887-CV, 2018 WL
1081635, at *2, *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ancor
Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 829 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2009, no pet.)) (The provisions “(a) All applicable Federal and State law . . . shall
apply” and “(b) All applicable claims, causes of action, remedies and defenses that would
be available in court shall apply” did not limit the power of the arbitrator.).
144. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.090.
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ability to review the award, an argument for exceeded powers rarely
leads to a vacated award.145
For example, the party moving for vacatur in YPF S.A. v. Apache Over-
seas, Inc. was not successful in arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his or
her power by not issuing a “reasoned award.”146 In that case, an indepen-
dent accountant (KPMG) and arbitrator ruled that Apache, the seller of
certain assets to YPF, owed YPF about $10 million. The purchase agree-
ment between the parties required the arbitrator to include “reasoning
supporting [its] determination.”147 Since the arbitrator did not include the
“[exact] arithmetic computations” that supported its decision, Apache
sought to vacate the award.148 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, however, found that the arbitrator issued a “reasoned award” by
noting that “it based its analysis on the parties’ statements and accounting
records, pointed to its finding on the accrual of liabilities, and explained
what documentation it found relevant in evaluating the proper refund
amount.”149 Practitioners should note that the Fifth Circuit has not laid
out an exact definition of a “reasoned award.”150 Rather, the court has
stated that a “‘reasoned award’ requires the arbitrators to submit ‘some-
thing short of findings and conclusions but more than a simple result.’”151
Conversely, Southwest Airlines v. Local 555 provides a good example
of how a party might prevail on exceeded powers grounds.152 In this case,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority by holding that a CBA between
Southwest Airlines and one of its unions became effective on the date
when it was signed, rather than when it was ratified.153 The express terms
of the CBA provided that it would “become effective upon ratifica-
tion.”154 Since the arbitrator ruled that the CBA became effective on the
execution date even though the CBA did not have any language to that
effect, the Fifth Circuit found that the arbitrator ignored the unambigu-
ous terms of the CBA and, in doing so, exceeded the scope of his
145. See, e.g., Pasadera Builders, LP v. Hughes, No. 04-17-00021-CV, 2017 WL 6345218,
at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (The arbitration
agreement did not “contain any language specifically foreclosing the panel from determin-
ing that neither party was a prevailing party” and “[s]ince the panel was not specifically
foreclosed from making that finding, the panel did not act in direct contravention of the
agreement or exceed its powers.”); Miller v. Walker, 582 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2018, no pet.) (holding that the award of attorney’s fees was within the arbitrator’s
authority and the trial court erred in modifying the award to vacate the award of attorney’s
fees).
146. YPF S.A. v. Apache Overseas, Inc., 924 F.3d 815, 821 (5th Cir. 2019).
147. Id. at 820.
148. Id. at 819.
149. Id. at 821.
150. Id. at 820.
151. Id. (quoting Sarofim v. Tr. Co. of the W., 440 F.3d 213, 215 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006)).
152. Sw. Airlines Co. v. Local 555, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 912 F.3d 838, 846–47
(5th Cir. 2019).
153. Id. at 840.
154. Id.
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authority.155
V. CONCLUSION
Over the Survey period (December 1, 2018 through November 30,
2019), the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and Texas state courts issued opinions discussed in this Survey
that give practitioners information regarding arbitration clause drafting,
arbitrability and gateway issues, enforcement of arbitration agreements,
appellate review of awards, arbitrator conduct, arbitrator authority, and
related jurisdictional issues.
155. Id. at 846–47.
